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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs 
DAVID SIMMONS and 
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 920800-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18a-l(2) (e) and § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the search warrant in this case was served 
"in the night" within the meaning of §77-23-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
The trial court's factual finding on this question is reviewed by 
this Court under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Bobo, 803 
P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Whether the failure of the search warrant affidavit 
to set forth specific facts justifying a nighttime search should 
result in the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the search 
warrant. This Court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Stewart v. State es rel. Deland, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
U.S. Const. Amendment IV [Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures]: The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5. Time for Service - Of-
ficer may request assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in 
the warrant that it be served in the daytime, 
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state 
a reasonable cause to believe a search is neces-
sary in the night to seize the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or al-
tered, or for other good reason; in which case 
he may insert a direction that it may be served 
any time of the day or night. An officer may 
request other persons to assist him in conduc-
ting the search. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal prosecution against the Defendant/ 
Appellees for possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute within 1000 feet of a child care facility in viola-
tion of §58-37-8(1). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
The Defendant/Appellees were charged with possession of 
a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute within 
1000 feet of a child care facility or with a person younger than 
eighteen years. After a preliminary hearing both defendants were 
bound over for trial in the district court (R. 1). The defendants 
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant 
to the execution of a search warrant on their residence on January 
20, 1992 (R. 40). After a hearing the motion to suppress was gran-
ted (R. 74). Proposed findings were submitted and objected to by 
the State (R. 67, 69), and a second hearing on the objections, and 
to consider the intervening Supreme Court decision in State v. Rowe, 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 9/28/92), was held (R. 82). After the se-
cond hearing the trial court reaffirmed its initial decision to sup-
press the evidence (R. 82), and the State took this interlocutory 
appeal (R. 117). 
Statement of Facts 
On January 20, 1992, Roy City police officer Carl Merino 
applied to the Circuit Court for a search warrant to search the resi-
dence of Defendants (R. 38). The affidavit in support of the appli-
cation contained no specific facts to support the application for 
night execution, but instead made only generalized statements appli-
cable to all drug cases and based only on the affiant's general con-
clusions (R. 40). Nonetheless, nighttime authority was included in 
the resulting search warrant (R. 43), which was executed that same 
date at 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). The parties stipulated that the sun set 
at 5:29 p.m. on that day (R. 83). Upon executing the search warrant 
the officers found and seized the evidence upon which this prosecu-
tion was initiated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court properly concluded that this search 
warrant was executed "in the night" within the statutory meaning. 
In the circumstances of this case, where the warrant was executed 
one hour after sunset in the winter, the trial judge's conclusion 
that night had fallen was not clearly erroneous. 
2. The exclusionary rule was properly applied to the 
evidence seized as a result of the execution of the defective search 
warrant. The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rowe, 
196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992) , relied upon the existence in that 
case of a valid arrest warrant which afforded an alternative lawful 
justification for the executing officers' presence in the place 
searched. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THIS WARRANT WAS 
EXECUTED "IN THE NIGHT" WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Unless the trial court's finding of fact that the search 
warrant in this case was executed "in the nighttime" was clearly 
erroneous, it should not be disturbed. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268 (Utah App. 1990) at 1271-2. The trial court's findings are 
"clearly erroneous" only if they are in conflict with the clear 
weight of the evidence, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, den. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990), or if the appellate 
court has a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made," State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
The factual basis in this record for the trial courtfs 
finding of "nighttime" is the parties' stipulation that the search 
warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. on a midwinter day when the sun 
had set an hour earlier at 5:29 p.m. Only these facts exist on the 
recordr and it is clear that the trial judge reached the finding of 
"nighttime" in one or both of the following ways: 
1. That common sense would dictate that darkness had 
descended an hour after sunset on a late January day, 
and that darkness was a sufficient basis to conclude 
that the warrant was served "in the night;" or 
2. That the word "night" in the statute should be defined 
as the period between sunset and sunrise. 
There are no Utah cases defining "nighttime" for the purpose 
of searches, State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), and the 
statute itself is silent on this point. There is, however, ample 
authority to support the trial court's conclusion that actual darkness 
constitutes "night." See, e.g., State v. Burnside, 741 P.2d 352 (Idaho 
1987), holding that unless there is sufficient natural light to 
distinguish a person's features, it is "night." In State v. Holman, 
424 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 1988), where the daytime warrant was executed 
at 8:00 p.m. on a day (March 31) on which it was stipulated the sun 
had set at 6:47 p.m., the court, holding that "daytime" extends from 
dawn to darkness, reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. The darkness standard is also adopted in Kuenzel v. State, 
577 So.2d 474 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). Although the record in this case 
does not expressly describe darkness, the only logical inference that 
may be drawn from the stipulation is that it was in fact dark when this 
warrant was executed, because on a midwinter day it will be dark 
long before an hour has passed since the sun has set. 
The only other logical conclusion the trial judge could 
have reached, that "night" is the period between sunset and sunrise, 
is equally sound. It is a fundamental rule of construction that 
statutory terms which are not specifically defined are to be taken 
in the sense in which they are understood in common language. State 
v. Holman, supra, at 628. Virtually every reputable dictionary con-
sulted gives as the preferred definition of "night," the "period 
between sunset and sunrise." Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1979). This division of time between day and 
night on the basis of sunset and sunrise is a universally accepted 
and commonly understood concept. 
The State urges this Court to define "night" in our sta-
tute by adopting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(h), which 
defines "daytime" as the period from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Such 
an arbitrary definition would effectively condone the execution of 
"daytime only" search warrants during the several hours each day of 
total darkness which fall within the specified hours during the 
winter. In light of the historical recognition that the search of 
a dwelling after darkness has fallen is even more invasive than one 
during daylight, State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) at 738-
39 and n. 10, 11 at 739, the adoption of such an arbitrary standard 
would therefore destroy the clear legislative intent to distinguish 
such searches. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
UPON THE EXECUTION OF THIS DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT. 
The State concedes that this search warrant was defective 
because the supporting affidavit lacked the requisite factual speci-
ficity to authorize nighttime entry. Brief of Appellant at 5 n. 2. 
This case is thus factually identical with State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court reversed a decision of 
this Court which had applied the exclusionary rule to evidence seized 
with a nighttime warrant which was defective in the same way as that 
in the present case. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
rev'd, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992). 
The disposition of this appeal depends on the proper inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court decision in Rowe II, where the Supreme 
Court said: 
"We have previously held that suppression 
of evidence is an appropriate remedy for il-
legal police conduct only when that conduct 
implicates a fundamental violation of a de-
fendant's rights, (citing State v. Fixel, 744 
P.2d 1366 [Utah 1987]).... 
Under the facts of this case, we conclude 
that the violation of section 77-23-5 did not 
implicate defendant's fundamental rights. . . . 
It is of particular significance that in 
addition to the search warrant for Swickey's 
apartment, the officers carried a valid war-
rant for Swickey's arrest. . . The officers' 
entry into the apartment during nighttime 
hours and without notice, although not proper-
ly authorized by the search warrant, was pro-
perly authorized by the warrant for Swickey's 
arrest. . . Inasmuch as the officers made law-
ful entry onto the premises and had general 
authority to secure those premises plus a va-
lid warrant to search the premises during the 
daylight, the improperly authorized execution 
of that search during the nighttime con-
stitutes a minimal intrusion on interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment." 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-16 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the assertion in the State's brief that Rowe 
II stands for the proposition that a violation of §77-23-5 is always 
procedural only, and never implicates a defendant's fundamental 
rights, the above language makes it clear that the particular facts 
of Rowe II compelled the conclusion in that case only. The Supreme 
Court carefully confined its holding to the facts of that case, 
and expressly tied its conclusion that the violation in that case 
did not involve a fundamental right to the existence of a valid ar-
rest warrant for one of the occupants of the dwelling. The concur-
ring opinion of Justice Durham (joined by Justice Zimmerman) empha-
sizes this point. Rowe II, supra, at 16. 
It is Appellees' position that because the police in this 
case, unlike Rowe II, did not simultaneously possess a valid arrest 
warrant for an occupant of the residence, the violation of §77-23-5 
involved a fundamental right under the Fourth Amendment, and the 
trial court therefore properly applied the exclusionary rule. Under 
this analysis, the showing of bad faith or prejudice which the State 
suggests becomes immaterial, since these factors come into play only 
if a violation does not "implicate a fundamental violation of a de-
fendant's rights." The violation in this case involved a fundamental 
right; indeed, the particularized requirements for nighttime searches 
may even be a "constitutional imperative." Rowe I, supra, n. 11 at 
739. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding that this search warrant was 
executed at "night" was based upon the parties1 stipulation that 
the warrant was served at 6:30 p.m. on a winter day when the sun 
had set an hour earlier at 5:29 p.m. The lower court reached this 
conclusion either through a common sense deduction that darkness had 
fallen and that it was therefore "night/1 or that "night" includes 
the period from sunset to sunrise. The former proposition cannot 
be said to be "clearly erroneous" under the relevant test, and the 
latter legal conclusion, given the universally accepted definition 
of "night," is supported by rules of statutory construction and 
decisional law. 
The Supreme Court decision in Rowe II does not hold that 
the violation of the nighttime requirements of §77-23-5 never im-
plicates a fundamental right of a defendant; the Rowe II opinion 
carefully confines its holding to the specific facts in that case, 
where a valid arrest warrant provided an alternative lawful means 
of entry into the residence. No such alternative exists to justify 
the nighttime search in this case, and the exclusionary rule was 
therefore properly invoked by the trial court. 
The trial court's suppression of the evidence should be 
affirmed. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
- vs -
DAVID SIMMONS and 
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS, 
Defendants• 
FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFEN-
DANTS1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal Nos. 921000014 
921000015 
The Defendants' Motion to Suppress came before the Court 
for hearing on August 3, 1992, and for rehearing on October 19, 1992; 
defendants were each present with counsel and the State was repre-
sented by Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County Attorney. A written 
Motion to Suppress evidence in these cases was previously filed 
and supporting Memoranda were filed by both parties. The State filed 
a Supplemental Memorandum herein. The parties stipulated that the 
search warrant in these cases was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January 
20, 1992 and that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. that day. The Court, 
having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and ha-
ving considered the Memoranda in support of and opposition to the 
motion, and being otherwise fully advised herein, the Court now 
makes the following findings: 
1. That the search warrant in these cases was executed 
in the nighttime. 
2. That the affidavit in support of the BpaTfeHatorr^ nf 
alleges no specific facts justifying a nighttime search as re-
quired by §77-23-5(1), Utah Code Ann., but rather alleges matters 
based upon the affiant's general knowledge and experience in drug 
cases. 
3. Because there is no evidence before the Court that 
the officers who executed the search warrant in this case had in 
their possession a valid warrant for the arrest of any person within 
the premises searched, the procedural defect in failing to include 
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and the nighttime execution 
of this search warrant, amounted to a fundamental violation of the 
Defendants1 rights requiring suppression of the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search warrant. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 
1987); State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992). 
Based upon the foregoing findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that all evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the search 
warrant in these cases, and the fruits of all such eyi^ence, be, 
and the same are hereby suppressed. 
DATED this jo day of CnJLubei, 199 
BY THE COURT^ 
;.vJttDKINS 
First District Judge 
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